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23andMe: Attack of the Clones
and Other Concerns
Claire M. Amodio*
A few years ago, ancestry websites took the world by storm. People were fascinated with their history and heritage and wanted to
find out more about where they came from. Then along came
23andMe, which allowed people to not only unearth their familial
roots, but also bring to light unknown medical conditions or predispositions to certain medical issues. 23andMe then took the unprecedented step of teaming up with a pharmaceutical company to create
drugs with its users’ genetic information. After this announcement,
some users were caught off guard, having had no idea that their
genetic information—something so sensitive and uniquely personal
to them—was being used to create drugs. While 23andMe presented
this possibility in their Research Consent Document, it is clear that
many users either did not read it or simply did not understand the
terms of their participation. This begs the question: how do users
effectively pull their genetic information from research they did not
necessarily intend to participate in?
Neither the current American statutory scheme nor property and
contract case law provide these users with protection or any way
to withdraw from all research they deem unacceptable. Courts have
ruled that people who allow their genetic information to be used
for research forfeit their property rights to it and that it is not relevant if people did not read the consent form they agreed to, as
*
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long as they were put on notice of additional terms. Since these
avenues for legal recourse are essentially blocked for users that
want to reclaim their genetic information, they should instead
pursue a clearer path. Examining gametic material jurisprudence—
a similarly situated but more consumer-friendly area of law which
involves disputes over the rights to the genetic information found in
eggs, sperm, and embryos—may just reveal that new path.
This Note examines the various issues 23andMe’s research program presents for users who wish to fully remove their genetic information from 23andMe’s research given the current American
statutory scheme and case law in various American jurisdictions.
Under these legal frameworks, the courts do not look to the intent of
the parties in deciding who has rights to the genetic material.
Rather, courts look to whether there was a forfeiture, consent, and
notice of terms. This is in spite of the well-documented fact that
people often do not fully read or understand contracts, especially
internet contracts, when they agree to them. In contrast, gametic
material jurisprudence looks beyond contracts and certain acts to
the intent of the donors in deciding who has rights to the gametic
material. This legal framework recognizes the reality that people do
not necessarily read or understand what they agree to when they
allow their genetic material to be used in research and gives those
who did not intend to participate in certain kinds of research a way
to permanently reclaim their genetic material.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2007, the personal genomics and biotechnology company
23andMe launched.1 23andMe enables its users to submit a spit
sample to the company, which analyzes it and creates an ancestry,
health, or combination report based on the type of kit ordered.2
23andMe, and companies like it, have surged in popularity in recent
years as technology that can reveal our ancestry and origin has developed at a rapid pace.3 Users have been drawn to this service because “our DNA is a way to help us paint a story of who we are,
understand what that means about our identity, and even dictate how

1

Megan Molteni, 23andMe’s Pharma Deals Have Been the Plan All Along, WIRED
(Aug. 3, 2018, 3:28 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-glaxosmithklinepharma-deal/ [https://perma.cc/LQ7Z-UFM2]; About Us, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter.
23andMe.com/company/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/C3G8-CHGG]; Nicole Wetsman,
23andMe Sold the Rights to a Drug It Developed from Its Genetic Database, THE VERGE
(Jan. 10, 2020, 3:50 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/10/21060456/23andMelicensed-drug-developed-genetic-database-autoimmune-psoriasis-almirall [https://perma.
cc/7N7M-7WVC].
2
How It Works, 23ANDME, https://www.23andMe.com/howitworks/ [https://
perma.cc/4TV6-44C4].
3
Sofia Sokolove, How Did DNA Kits Become So Popular—and What’s Next?, ALCADE
(June 30, 2018, 2:24 PM), https://alcalde.texasexes.org/2018/06/how-did-dna-kitsbecome-so-popular-and-whats-next/ [https://perma.cc/A5R2BY8U].
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we should move through the world.”4 It is not only a somewhat
affordable way to learn whether one is predisposed to any diseases
or other health problems, but also gives people a look into their—
and their family’s—genetic past.5
In the midst of its meteoric rise in 2018, 23andMe teamed up
with the huge pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline, giving
GlaxoSmithKline exclusive rights to 23andMe’s users’ data to
create drugs.6 By 2018, however, 23andMe had already been sharing
its users’ personal information with other pharmaceutical companies
for three and a half years.7 Although 23andMe claims that 80% of
its roughly 12,000,000 users agree to have their DNA used for
research,8 many reported being “surprised and angry, unaware of
what they had already signed (and spat) away.”9 Some users were
also completely unaware that 23andMe retained virtually unfettered access to and control over their genetic information.10 While
23andMe users must sign terms of service agreements that include
information regarding the use of their DNA for various types of
research,11 it is unclear whether they fully understand its ramifications, one of which being that the users cannot profit from any
drug development that may result from the use of their DNA.12
4

Id.
Id.
6
Molteni, supra note 1.
7
Id.
8
About Us, supra note 1.
9
Molteni, supra note 1.
10
Id.
11
Id.; Terms of Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andMe.com/about/tos/
[https://perma.cc/4LKS-PF3R].
12
Molteni, supra note 1; Research Consent Document, 23ANDME, https://www.23
andMe.com/about/consent/ [https://perma.cc/5UYF-AGUN]; Valerie Gutmann Koch,
Pgtandme: Social Networking-Based Genetic Testing and the Evolving Research Model,
22 HEALTH MATRIX 33, 71 (2012); Katherine Drabiak, Caveat Emptor: How the
Intersection of Big Data and Consumer Genomics Exponentially Increases Informational
Privacy Risks, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 143 (2017); Anne S.Y. Cheung, Moving Beyond
Consent for Citizen Science in Big Data Health and Medical Research, 16 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 15, 23–25 (2018); J. Lyn Entrikin, Family Secrets and Relational Privacy:
Protecting Not-So-Personal, Sensitive Information from Public Disclosure, 74 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 781, 867 (2020); JENS OMDAL, THE BATTLE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND PROGRESS:
HOW GENOMIC COMPANIES PLAN TO MOVE INTO PERSONALIZED HEALTHCARE AND WHAT
IT MEANS FOR YOUR PRIVACY (2020); Matthew Rimmer, 23andMe Inc.: Patent Law and
Lifestyle Genetics, 22(1) J.L. INFO. & SCI. 132, 153–58 (2012).
5
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Indeed, most Americans support human genetics research, believing
it to be important for their own and the country’s overall health.13
They are thus willing to “grant broad consent for future use of their
genetic information.” 14 However, “[o]nce educated on privacy concerns regarding genetic information, individuals are less likely to
support public data availability.”15
Current bodily property jurisprudence offers little protection for
unwitting 23andMe users whose DNA has been used for research or
drug development as significant deference is given to scientists engaged in these endeavors, particularly with respect to novel genomic
drugs and other therapies.16 This Note argues that because of evolving technological and scientific landscapes and the potential for
DNA to be used for much more than drug development, courts
should begin giving users more protection and control over their genetic material. This could be achieved by encouraging courts to investigate users’ intent upon signing up for the service, determine
whether users actually read or understood the service’s research
contract when they signed it and uploaded their DNA to the site, and
to eschew traditional contract jurisprudence in favor of a more nuanced approach.
Part I examines 23andMe’s history, its Research Consent Document, and the concerns and controversies surrounding the website’s
research and storage of genetic information. Part II discusses the different types of internet contracts and how courts treat them, studies
that show most internet users do not adequately read or understand
internet contracts, and problems the average 23andMe user may encounter as a result. It also examines the legal implications of these
problems; mainly that 23andMe users have no legal recourse to correct them. Part III argues that courts should look to the intent of the
user and her understanding of the research contract when she signed
13

Americans Strongly Support Human Genetics Research and Potential, SCI. DAILY
(Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/01/200129091531.htm
[https://perma.cc/84K9-EGCX].
14
Kelsey Russo, The Digital Life of Henrietta Lacks: Reforming the Regulation of
Genetic Material, 38 J. LEGAL MED. 449, 467 (2018) (internal quotations omitted).
15
Id.
16
See generally Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 146 (1990);
Greenberg v. Miami Child. Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003);
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 2007).
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up for 23andMe, and further that they should eschew traditional contracts jurisprudence in favor of the user in these cases.
I.

23ANDME’S HISTORY, RESEARCH, AND CONTROVERSIES
SURROUNDING ITS PRACTICES.

This Part examines statutes and the attendant case law to demonstrate that people do not have control over the disposition of their
body parts once relinquished, except under very limited circumstances. Moreover, if they agreed to 23andMe’s Research Consent
Document, they will most likely be held to it by the courts, leaving
23andMe users with little to no legal recourse to reclaim their
genetic information once they have given it to 23andMe and agreed
to participate in their research.
A. Factual Background
1. The Evolution of 23andMe
Gaining access to one’s own genetic information was not always
simple or affordable.17 Once upon a time, unlocking the secrets of
one’s own genetic material once was quite expensive and required
direct access to experts in the field. Now, the evolution of technology and an expanding market has allowed early genomics studies to
transform into the current genetic information industry—one that
provides users with a complex analysis of their genes through a simple cheek swab and email.18 Geneticist Michael Hammer conducted
one of the first studies and discovered that a subset of Jewish men
shared “distinctive genetic traits,” which he published in 1997.19
Jewish men soon began contacting Hammer to see if they were part
of the same subgroup.20 While initially hesitant, he began taking
their cheek swabs to analyze the results and charging them to offset
the cost.21

17
18
19
20
21

Sokolove, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In 2003, Spencer Wells, an adjunct professor at the University
of Texas, released the documentary Journey of Man with National
Geographic and PBS; it showcased how he researched human migration patterns using the Y chromosome.22 People were intrigued.23
In 2005, Wells launched the first direct-to-consumer genetic testing
kit with The Genographic Project, which sequenced users’ DNA and
gave them “deep ancestry insights.”24 The company sold 10,000 kits
on the first day.25
Due to the success of The Genographic Project, 23andMe
launched in 2006.26 The company initially charged users $1,000 per
kit, which proved to be prohibitively expensive for many potential
customers.27 However, after the company lowered its prices, its
share of the market increased dramatically.28 In 2012, Ancestry.com
launched its own genomics company with AncestryDNA.29 By
2015, 23andMe and Ancestry had tested over one million people; by
2016, they reached over two million.30 In 2017, Illumina, the company that makes direct-to-consumer genetics technology for
23andme and others, estimated that 7,000,000 people had been
tested in that year alone.31
Today, 23andMe is a powerhouse—it has penetrated pop culture
and boasts millions of users, many of which describe having profound experiences.32 23andMe posts stories to its blog about people
who have learned more about themselves, their ancestry, and their
health through its services.33 In one blog post, 23andMe interviewed
Jeremiah, an African-American man, who could not accurately trace
22

Id.
Id.
24
Id.; The Genographic Project Geno 2.0 Next Generation Helix Product Privacy
Policy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/legal/privacy/genogra
phic/ [https://perma.cc/BM3W-K8JP].
25
Sokolove, supra note 3.
26
Id.; About Us, supra note 1.
27
Sokolove, supra note 3.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
See generally 23ANDME BLOG, https://blog.23andme.com/ [https://perma.cc/
F27L-FZTU].
33
Id.
23
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back his ancestry due to slavery.34 Once he took a 23andMe test,
however, he was able to trace his roots back to Ghana, Nigeria, the
Congo, and other parts of Africa.35 He told 23andMe that “[i]n that
one moment, he felt connected.”36 In another blog post, Jessica Algazi wrote how she used 23andMe and discovered she was carrying
the BRCA1 gene, which greatly increases one’s chances of developing breast or ovarian cancer.37 Jessica recounted how she “dodged
a bullet” and that there are “many women walking around with this
risk, who, like me, would have never known of their own risk but
for this test from 23andMe.”38 Powerful stories such as these may
prompt anyone with difficulty tracing back through their ancestry or
family’s medical history to use 23andMe to get a better picture of
themselves and any possible health risks they may carry.
In order for 23andMe users to have these profound experiences,
they must first purchase a kit, collect a sample of their DNA, and
send it back to receive their results. 23andMe offers various kits for
users to choose from that differ based on price and services provided. One kit, for example, simply offers ancestry information,
while another offers both ancestry information and health data.39
Whatever the user chooses, 23andMe will have access to her DNA
and genetic history once she sends in her spit swab.40

34

Learning About Yourself with 23andMe, 23ANDME (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://blog.23andMe.com/23andMe-customer-stories/learning-about-yourself-with23and
Me/ [https://perma.cc/UF6R-M8BM].
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Jessica Algazi, 23andMe Alerted Me to My BRCA1 Variant, 23ANDME
(Dec. 6, 2019), https://blog.23andMe.com/23andMe-customer-stories/23andMe-alertedme-to-my-brca1-variant/ [https://perma.cc/7VF8-X3G7].
38
Id.
39
There are two kinds of kits: (1) Ancestry + Traits Kit and (2) Health + Ancestry
Service Kit. The Ancestry + Traits Kit is $99 and provides the user with an ancestry report
including Ancestry Percentages (to the 0.1%), Automatic Family Tree Builder, 30+ Trait
Reports, and DNA Relative Finder. The Health + Ancestry Service is $199 and includes
everything in the Ancestry + Traits Kit plus 10+ Health Predisposition Reports, 5+
Wellness Reports, and 40+ Carrier Status Reports. Users can choose which kit is best for
them based on their budget and what they are looking for out of 23andMe. Compare Our
Services, 23ANDME, https://www.23andMe.com/compare-dna-tests/ [https://perma.cc/
J3WC-ERMU].
40
See id.
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2. 23andMe’s Research Consent Document
When a user signs up for a free 23andMe account, even if she
did not provide her genetic information to the website, she automatically agrees to both the Privacy Statement and the Terms of Service.41 These state that the user completely waives her property
rights in any research, products that result from research on her
DNA, or any information the user provides to the site; the document
also indemnifies 23andMe from any liability resulting from the use
or disclosure of her genetic information.42 23andMe also provides
users with a Research Consent Document, where the user allows
23andMe to use her genetic information in research that supposedly
aims to “[d]iscover genetic factors behind diseases and traits,
[u]ncover connections among diseases and traits, [l]earn about human migration and population history through genetics, [and]
[u]nderstand how people react to their personal genetic information.”43
In order for her DNA to be included in research, the 23andMe
user must first agree to the Research Consent Document (the “Document”).44 23andMe contends that about 80% of its users consent to
research, which is roughly 9,600,000 people.45 It is unclear whether
people consent because they want to help others or because they did
not in fact read the Document before signing, or some mixture of
both. It should be noted that the Document is ten pages when
printed.

41

Terms of Service, supra note 11.
Id.
43
Research Consent Document, supra note 12.
44
Privacy Policy, 23ANDME, https://www.23andMe.com/en-int/about/privacy/
[https://perma.cc/AG3B-ZM69]; Research Consent Document, supra note 12.
45
About Us, supra note 1; Wetsman, supra note 1.
42
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The Document can be found on 23andMe’s website before creating an account. The “key points” of the Document are listed before
the rest of the agreement, presumably so users can quickly read what
they are consenting to before they scroll to the bottom of the page
and accept. Importantly, none of the key points mention anything
about drug research.46

46

Research Consent Document, supra note 12.
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23andMe researchers to use her genetic and self-reported information in research and that she will, at her election, enter inform-
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ation about herself into the 23andMe features on its website.47
The 23andMe research features include “surveys, individual questions, and other features” where the user enters information about
herself.48 The Document provides that if the user does not feel comfortable providing certain information, she may elect not to answer
that question and she can choose to take part in “all, some, or none
of the surveys.”49
Halfway through the Document, 23andMe informs the user of
the kind of research it will be performing with her DNA.50 The Document provides that the user’s genetic and self-reported information
may be used to research:
[L]inks between genetic markers, non-genetic markers, traits, diseases, behaviors and other characteristics; human migrations or population history; or to
assess how people respond to personal genetic information. Discoveries made as a result of this research
could be used to understand the basic causes of disease, develop drugs or other treatments and/or preventive measures, or predict a ’person’s risk of disease. The topics to be studied span a wide range of
traits and conditions, from common to rare. The topics include simple traits such as hair color or freckles,
serious diseases such as Parkinson’s disease or diabetes, and less serious conditions such as migraine
headaches or response to over-the-counter drugs.
Some of these studies may be sponsored by or conducted on behalf of third parties, such as non-profit
foundations, academic institutions or pharmaceutical companies.”51
The Document also provides information on the myriad of risks
that can arise from allowing DNA to be used in research, but only

47
48
49
50
51

Id.; see also Drabiak, supra note 12, at 155–59.
Research Consent Document, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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starting on page seven.52 The risks vary in severity.53 Moreover, it
states that if the user does consent to participate in research, she can
choose not to take certain surveys.54 This gives users the choice to
participate passively in research by just providing their genetic information or more actively by answering questions that might provide more insight to researchers.
If users originally consented to research but have since changed
their minds, the Document provides that they may withdraw all or
some of their genetic and self-reported information from 23andMe
research at any time, but if:
[Y]ou withdraw all or some of your Genetic & SelfReported Information, 23andMe will prevent that information from being used in new 23andMe Research initiated after 30 days from receipt of your request (it may take up to 30 days to withdraw your
information after you withdraw your consent). Any
research on your data that has been performed or
published prior to this date will not be reversed, undone, or withdrawn.”55
In other words, if the user originally consented to participate in
research and then changes her mind, her information will only be
removed from being considered for use in future research and will
not be taken out of research that has begun before the 30-day period
or that has already finished.56

52

Id.
Research Consent Document, supra note 12; see also Drabiak, supra note 12; Sarah
Washburn, Controlling Your DNA: Privacy Concerns in Genomic Testing and the
Uncertainty of Federal Regulation and Legislation, 18 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 22
(2016); Eunice Park, Objects, Places and Cyber-Spaces Post-Carpenter: Extending the
Third-Party Doctrine Beyond CSLI: A Consideration of IoT and DNA, 21 YALE J. L. &
TECH. 1, 44 (2019).
54
Research Consent Document, supra note 12.
55
Id. (emphasis added).
56
See Drabiak, supra note 12.
53
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B. Legal Background
1. GINA
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) prohibits employers from using genetic information to make employment decisions “such as hiring, firing, advancement, compensation,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”57
There are no exceptions.58 Under GINA, genetic information includes: information about a person’s genetic tests; information about
a family members’ genetic test; family medical history; requests for
and receipt of genetic services by a person or a family member; and
the genetic information of a fetus or embryo carried or legally held
by a family member or other individual.59 According to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), an example of an
employer illegally using genetic information would be “for an employer to reassign an employee from a job it believes is too stressful
after learning of his family medical history of heart disease.”60
23andMe mentions GINA in its Terms of Service when it warns
users to be careful about sharing their genetic information with other
people.61 The company states that few businesses or insurance companies ask people for their genetic information, but as with anything,
this could always change.62 Importantly, the company notes that
while GINA has been in effect in the United States since 2008,
“its protection against discrimination by employers and health insurance companies for employment and coverage issues has not
been clearly established” and “does not cover life, long-term care,

57

U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-NVTA-0000-4, FACT SHEET:
GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT (2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/guidance/fact-sheet-genetic-information-nondiscrimination-act
[https://perma.cc/WL37-L97S]; 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff.
58
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-NVTA-0000-4, FACT SHEET:
GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT (2014), available at https://www.eeoc.
gov/laws/guidance/fact-sheet-genetic-information-nondiscrimination-act [https://perma.
cc/WL37-L97S].
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Terms of Service, supra note 11.
62
Id.
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or disability insurance providers.”63 23andMe further notes that
while some states have laws protecting people’s genetic information, many do not and suggests that the user consult a lawyer to
fully understand the scope of the legal protection over her genetic
information in her jurisdiction.64
Further, 23andMe maintains that any genetic information users
choose to share with their doctors may become part of their medical
records and “through that route be accessible to other health care
providers and/or insurance companies in the future.”65 Likewise, it
advises that any genetic information the user shares with anyone
may be against her interest and “[e]ven if you share Genetic Information that has no or limited meaning today, that information could
have greater meaning in the future as new discoveries are made.”66
23andMe also advises that it may be considered fraud if the user’s
insurance company asks if the user is aware of any health conditions
from her genetic information and she does not disclose them.67
23andMe’s specific mention of GINA in its Terms of Service is
important for multiple reasons. First, it acknowledges that sharing
genetic information can be risky and that, in the future, businesses
and insurance companies could start asking for the user’s genetic
information. Second, it acknowledges that while GINA is good law,
its protection is not “clearly established” and it does not cover all
types of insurance.68 23andMe is essentially warning its users that
their genetic information may be used against them at a later date
for insurance purposes and its protection cannot be guaranteed. In
fact, the company goes on to recommend speaking to a lawyer to
understand how the user’s genetic information may be protected in
their jurisdiction.69 These sections of the Terms of Service are parti63

Id. (emphasis added); see also Leslie E. Wolf et al., The Web of Legal Protections for
Participants in Genomic Research, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 35–36 (2019); Josef A. Mejido,
Personalized Genomics: A Need for a Fiduciary Duty Remains, 37 RUTGERS COMPUT. &
TECH. L.J. 281, 294 (2011); Kristi Harbord, Genetic Data Privacy Solutions in the GDPR,
7 TEX. A&M L. REV. 269, 279 (2019).
64
Terms of Service, supra note 11.
65
Id. (emphasis added).
66
Id. (emphasis added).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
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cularly significant because 23andMe acknowledges that the user’s
genetic information may not be protected by law and that, even if it
is, only a lawyer would be able to properly explain how or to what
extent.70 Finally, while GINA offers some protection in the employment and insurance contexts, it does not offer any protection for
research misuse.71
2. HIPAA
Generally, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (“HIPAA”) provides fairly limited protection of genetic information.72 Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996 and “included two provisions that restricted group health insurers’ use of health-related information in making coverage decisions and setting premiums.”73
Under HIPAA, genetic information cannot be used to make coverage decisions or to set premiums if it is “maintained by a health provider or health plan covered by [HIPAA].”74 Likewise, HIPAA definitively states that “genetic information in the absence of a diagnosis cannot be considered a pre-existing condition.”75
However, given the technological advancements since the passing of HIPAA and the rise of companies like 23andMe, which have
started teaming up with drug companies, it is clear that HIPAA is
not as expansive as necessary.76 Specifically, HIPPA does not forbid
insurance companies from requesting genetic information from
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people they already insure or “using genetic information during the
insurance underwriting process.”77 Likewise, HIPAA forbids health
insurance companies from charging higher premiums “of an individual within a group plan based on genetic makeup, [but] it allows
insurers to charge the entire group a higher rate.”78 Perhaps most
importantly, HIPAA does not limit the disclosure of genetic information from third parties to insurance companies.79
Given these facts, one might reasonably wonder—is it legal under federal law for an insurance company to request a different person’s genetic information from one of their insured.80 It would certainly be legal for insurance companies to use a 23andMe user’s genetic information to charge her more as long as the insurance companies charge the group with which she shares certain genetic characteristics more.81 Additionally, HIPAA doesn’t appear to restrict
23andMe from sending genetic information to insurance companies.82 Finally, HIPAA offers no protection for research misuse.83
3. Case Law Regarding Control and Ownership Over
Body Parts
Courts have held that, generally, people do not have property
rights in their own body parts once they give them up.84 In Moore v.
Regents of University of California,85 Moore underwent treatment
for hairy-cell leukemia at UCLA Medical Center and then underwent a splenectomy at the advice of his doctor, Golde.86 He continued to go to UCLA and receive treatment—there, Golde withdrew
blood, skin, bone marrow, and sperm samples from him.87 During
this time, Golde performed research using Moore’s samples and
77
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eventually created a cell-line, which he patented.88 Moore sued
Golde and the Regents of California for conversion, which is a tort
under property law “that protects against interference with possessory and ownership interests in personal property.”89
The court found, first, that there was no reported precedent supporting Moore’s claim that he had an ownership right or a sufficient
interest in his cells to warrant a conversion claim “either directly or
by close analogy.”90 Next, the court found that California statutes
severely limit “any continuing interest of a patient in excised cells”91
and, finally, that UCLA’s patented cell-line and the products derived
from it “cannot be Moore’s property.”92
The court found that the cell-line and any products that derived
from it could not be Moore’s property because they are “both factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from Moore’s body”
and that federal law only permits patenting products of human ingenuity, not naturally occurring organisms such as cells taken from a
body.93 Moreover, the Court refused to extend conversion to cover
body parts because this may “hinder research by restricting access
to the necessary raw materials.”94 Regents was the first in a string of
decisions which held that people do not have property interests in
their own body parts because it is unprecedented and granting such
interests may ultimately harm productive research.95
Years later, in Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc., a court found that people “have no cognizable
property interest in body tissue and genetic matter donated for research under a theory of conversion” and therefore have no rights to
a patent that resulted therefrom.96 The court also refused to extend
the informed consent doctrine to cover disclosure of researchers’

88

Id. at 168 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Id. at 37.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 141–42.
94
Id. at 144.
95
See generally id.; Greenberg v. Miami Child.’s Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp.
2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007).
96
Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
89

944

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXXI:926

economic interests in their own research because it “would have pernicious effects over medical research, as it would give each donor
complete control over how medical research is used and who benefits from that research.”97 Here, the court made a point of stating that
not only do people not have property rights in their own body parts,
but that research subjects do not have to be informed of researchers’
economic interests in the research they are conducting.98 The court
was concerned about disclosure to research subjects primarily because of the possibility that the subjects may refuse to partake in
research or try to exert more control over the research. The court
expressed concern that this could potentially hinder scientific progress without acknowledging that the subjects may have an interest
in the disposition of their bodily materials.99
In another seminal case, Washington Univ. v. Catalona, the
Court found that people who make “an informed decision to contribute their biological materials voluntarily to a particular research
institution for the purpose of medical research [do not] retain an
ownership interest allowing the individuals to direct or authorize the
transfer of such materials to a third party.”100 Here, the Court once
again emphasized that people who give their body parts to research
do not have any ownership interest in those body parts.
Washington University claimed that the research subjects made
an inter-vivos gift to them which, under the law, requires that the
proponent present the donor’s intent to make a gift the donor’s delivery of the property to the donee; and the donee’s acceptance and
automatic ownership of the gift,101 The Court found that the individuals did intend to make a gift to the university because they signed
a consent form which “emphasized the voluntariness” of their participation, described how they could decline to participate or “withdraw consent at any time,”102 and because they were given brochures that said they would be making “gifts” to the University.103
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
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Catalona, 490 F.3d at 673.
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The Court also found that since the brochures described that the bodily materials donated by participants could be shared with researchers outside of Washington University—without needing additional
consent from the participants—this in turn sufficiently informed the
participants that they were abandoning “the right to designate the
particular destination of their biological materials” when they
agreed to participate in the research.104 Further, the court found that
the language in the brochure coupled with the consent form, could
not “reasonably be characterized as reflecting the [participants’]
intention either to entrust their samples solely to Dr. Catalona or
to transfer the samples in some legal form other than a gift.”105
The Court also found that the second and third elements were met.106
C. Internet Contracts Jurisprudence
Contract law also plays a part in 23andMe’s users experiences
and possible legal recourse. Courts consistently find internet contracts to be enforceable where users are put on notice of the contracts’ terms. There are primarily four kinds of internet contracts:
browsewrap, clickwrap, scrollwrap, and sign-in-wrap.107 Browsewrap is a type of contract where the website determines that a user
assents “merely by using the site.”108 A clickwrap contract is where
the user “must click ‘I agree,’ but [does] not necessarily view the
contract to which she is assenting.”109 In a scrollwrap contract, the
user must “physically scroll through an internet agreement and click
on a separate ‘I agree’ button in order to assent to the terms and
conditions of the host website.”110 Finally, Sign-in-wrap is a type
of contract where the user essentially assents to the terms of the
website by “signing up for use of the site’s services.”111 23andMe’s
Research Consent Document falls under the scrollwrap definition
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because it requires the user to scroll all the way to the end of the
agreement and click “I agree” to consent to the terms.
Courts almost always find that scrollwrap agreements, which require the user to scroll down through the contract and click “I agree”
to assent to its terms,112 to be enforceable “because they present the
consumer with a ‘realistic opportunity’ to review the terms of the
contract and they require a physical manifestation of assent.”113 For
example, in Applebaum v. Lyft Inc., the court found that the user
assented to Lyft’s arbitration agreement through a scrollwrap agreement because he had the “realistic opportunity” to view the terms
and consented.114 On the other hand, courts are skeptical of clickwrap agreements, where the user has to click “I agree” but does not
necessarily see the contract to which she is agreeing,115 because they
do “not require the user to review the terms of the proposed agreement.”116 However, even in these circumstances courts still generally find them enforceable because “‘[b]y requiring a physical manifestation of assent, a user is said to be put on inquiry notice of the
terms assented to.’”117 Significantly, the Ninth Circuit found the
mandatory arbitration clause in 23andMe’s Terms of Service, which
is a clickwrap agreement, to be enforceable.118 Traditionally, courts
have found that the person agreeing to a contract does not necessarily need to read its terms to be bound. The courts rely on this
contracts jurisprudence in finding that, for internet contracts, to “be
bound, an internet user need not actually read the terms and conditions or click on a hyperlink that makes them available as long as
she has notice of their existence.”119
Internet contracts jurisprudence is significant because courts
will find online contracts enforceable—sometimes even if the terms
are not readily apparent—because users are put on some form of
112
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notice of the terms and must assent to them.120 Additionally, and
even more significantly, courts will find users bound by the contract
they agreed to, even if they did not read or fully understand its terms,
as long as they were on notice that there were terms to which they
were agreeing.121 This means that hundreds of thousands of internet
users will be bound to the terms of the contracts they assented to
online, even if they did not read or actually understand them, simply
because they were put “on notice” of the terms.122
However, courts have noted that determining the classification
of a contract—such as a scrollwrap or clickwrap agreement, for example—or whether the user clicked a box does not end the inquiry
of whether the user assented to the contract, for [a] court “cannot
presume that a person who clicks on a box that appears on a…screen
has notice of all contents not only of that page but of other content
that requires further action (scrolling, following a link, etc.).”123
Importantly, the “presentation of the online agreement matters” in
determining whether the user was actually on notice of the existence
of additional terms and “depends heavily on whether the design and
content of that webpage rendered the existence of terms reasonably
conspicuous’” to the user.124 Indeed, the “[c]larity and conspicuousness” of the terms are crucial in determining whether the website
secured the user’s informed assent.125
In other words, courts cannot presume the user is on notice of
terms that may require scrolling, for example, and should look to the
presentation of the website to see if extra terms are reasonably conspicuous to the user.126 This gives courts some leeway to find that a
clickwrap or scrollwrap agreement is not valid, especially if all of
the terms are not reasonably conspicuous to the user. However, this
tends to be a rare occurrence with internet contracts.
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Current legislation and case law do not recognize or protect people’s property rights in their own genetic material. GINA, which
specifically references genetic material, is a narrow statute, which
protects people from employment discrimination based on their genetic information.127 It does not protect against other forms of discrimination based on genetic information or give people any remedies if their genetic information is misused. HIPAA protects people
from insurance companies charging higher premiums based on what
is found in their genetic information but does not protect them in the
event that their genetic information is misused in another way. Case
law offers no protection either. Courts have repeatedly refused to
recognize people’s property rights over their own body parts.128
Moreover, courts repeatedly find that if users were put on notice of
additional terms, they will be held to the internet contracts to which
they agreed, even if they did not totally understand to what they were
agreeing.129 However, some courts have taken a different approach
when it comes to gametic material, the genetic information found in
eggs, sperm, and embryos. 130
II. DEFICIENCIES OF THE CURRENT LAWS GOVERNING 23ANDME

Currently, the law does not protect 23andMe users seeking to
reclaim their genetic information. Although two federal statutes, the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) and the
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”),
address the uses and misuses of information derived from DNA,
these laws are inapplicable to 23andMe users’ situations. Moreover,
courts have consistently held that people do not have property rights
over their own body parts: once a person has relinquished a body
part for research she no longer has any control over it.131 Additionally, courts generally always hold people to the scrollwrap contracts
they agreed to, even if they did not read or totally understand the
contracts’ terms.132
To provide a broad overview, 23andMe users who want their
DNA pulled from research are not protected by the United States’
current statutory scheme, traditional body part ownership jurisprudence, or contracts jurisprudence. The almost complete inability for
23andMe users to regain control over the disposition of their genetic
material becomes extremely problematic once 23andMe begins to
push the limits of the “consent” given to the company in its Research
Consent Document.
In sum, courts have held that research participants have no property rights over their body parts once they have relinquished them to
research.133 Courts have adhered to this jurisprudence because precedent has established that byproducts of body parts are “factually
and legally distinct from” the original body parts used to create
them;134 that the extension of property rights to body parts will have
an adverse effect on research;135 and that people who make an informed decision to give up their bodily materials for research do not
retain an ownership interest in them.136 This puts 23andMe users,
such as Jane, in a difficult position to mount a conversion claim,
because they have technically made an informed decision, based on
the Research Consent Document they signed and were supposed to
131
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understand, to allow their genetic material to be used in research and
have therefore relinquished any property rights they had to their genetic material under the law. Because the courts have expressly rejected the notion that people who have allowed their body parts to
be used in research have sufficient property rights over those body
parts to warrant conversion claims, 23andMe users who want to pursue this path are left with the difficult task of trying to convince the
courts to overturn years of precedent to the contrary.
Moreover, despite consistent findings that people fail to fully
read or comprehend contracts,137 courts almost always find that
when someone has the opportunity to read an internet contract, such
as the case with scrollwrap agreements, that is sufficient to hold
them to the terms of it, even if they did not read it or did not spend
a sufficient amount of time reading it to understand it.138 This poses
a problem for those like the 23andMe users in 2018 who did not
realize, for example, they were agreeing to potential drug research
and creation when they agreed that their genetic information could
be used in research until the GlaxoSmithKline deal.139 This problem
could become even greater if 23andMe begins pushing the boundaries of the provisions in the Research Consent Document to research
something far more controversial, such as cloning.
This Part examines both and GINA and HIPAA, as well as the
attendant case law, to demonstrate that people do not have control
over the disposition of their body parts once relinquished, except
under very limited circumstances. Moreover, if they agreed to
23andMe’s Research Consent Document, they will most likely be
held to it by the courts, leaving 23andMe users with little to no legal
recourse to reclaim their genetic information once they have given
it to 23andMe and agreed to participate in research.
A. Hypothetical
The lack of protection provided by current legislation and case
law poses potentially large legal and ethical problems for 23andMe
137
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users. Consider the following hypothetical. Jane Smith is a Catholic
woman with a history of leukemia in her family. Leukemia may or
may not be genetic and Jane wants to see if she is at risk. After hearing stories of people who used 23andMe to determine their predisposition to certain illnesses, Jane decides to buy a kit and sign up for
the service. She sends in her cheek swab and creates an account on
23andMe’s website so that she may receive her results. While on the
website, she sees that she can consent to have her DNA used in research. Feeling compelled by her own family’s history of illness, she
decides to consent in the hopes that the research may help people
like herself and her family. She looks at the Research Consent Document, reads the key points located at the top, skims the rest, and
then clicks “I consent” at the bottom of the page. Jane occasionally
provides more information about herself through surveys to
23andMe throughout the years. She is not notified of any particular
research that has taken place using her DNA.
One day, years later, she sees on the news that 23andMe has
performed research that has resulted in the beginning stages of cloning certain body parts, so that people who have lost body parts or
are born without them may receive these cloned versions instead of
prosthetics. Jane knows that cloning is against her religion, and fears
that her DNA may have been involved in this cloning project even
though Jane did not think her DNA would be used for that type of
research or intend for it to be. She goes onto the 23andMe website
to withdraw her consent but is informed by the terms that her genetic
information will only be withdrawn from future research and cannot
be withdrawn from past research or research that has already begun.
Jane is upset and looks into her legal options to get back control of
her genetic information from 23andMe. She does research and discovers that once a person has given up any type of body part for
research, she cannot sue to get it back and that, in this context, her
genetic information is not protected by either GINA or HIPAA. Remembering that she barely read the Research Consent Document,
and therefore did not truly understand what she was signing up for,
she researches whether she can say she did not really consent to the
contract she signed and get her genetic information back that way.
However, her research shows that most courts will hold her to the
contract, even if she did not read the whole thing, because she was
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technically given adequate notice of its terms. Jane has no legal recourse to reacquire her genetic information and may have contributed to something directly against her religion as a result.
The current legal landscape creates great problems for people
like Jane Smith, who consented to research thinking that her DNA
would be used one way while it was instead used for research which
she finds objectionable. At present, there is no real legal recourse
for Jane or those in similar situations. This is exacerbated by the fact
that most people do not read contracts on the internet, yet courts do
not recognize this reality.140
B. 23andMe’s Research Consent Document Concerns
23andMe’s Research Consent Document presents a plethora of
concerns for its users who agree to it. To start, the document provides broad language about what kind of research in which users’
genetic information may be used, such as determining “the basic
causes of disease, develop[ing] drugs or other treatments and/or preventive measures, or predict[ing] a ’person’s risk of disease” which
“may be sponsored by or conducted on behalf of third parties, such
as non-profit foundations, academic institutions or pharmaceutical
companies.”141
This means that 23andMe can use a user’s genetic information
for a wide range of research topics, including diseases and migration
patterns of certain peoples. However, it also provides that 23andMe
can use this information to create drugs, medical treatments, and
preventative measures. This provision is incredibly broad and

140
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allows for 23andMe not only to create drugs, as it already has,142
but also to push the boundaries of what “treatments and/or preventative measures” means all with users’ alleged “consent.” To put
it another way, 23andMe can push the boundaries of ethical norms
by stretching the meaning of treatments and preventative measures
to include extreme measures such as cloning, all with people’s unwitting consent.
These provisions are on the fifth page of the ten-page Research
Consent Document and after the initial “key points” portion that appears before the full agreement.143 The key points portion of the document may discourage an average reader from reading beyond that
point, figuring she can obtain all the information she needs from that
section without having to read the entire document. But even if a
user were to read beyond the key points, the information regarding
use of genetic material for drug research is halfway through the document, making it less likely that someone who even attempts to read
the entire contract will see or remember the provision.144
The document also explicitly provides information on the myriad of risks that can arise from allowing DNA to be used in research,
but only starting on page seven.145 The risks vary in severity.146 For
instance, one of the risks is that survey questions or data comparisons may make the user or her family members uncomfortable.147
However, there are much more severe risks, such as the potential for
the user’s genetic information, survey responses, or personally identifiable information to be stolen in a security breach, which could be
made public or released to insurance companies. This may create a
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“negative effect on [the user’s] ability to obtain insurance coverage.”148
Likewise, if the user or her family member has genetic information linked to her own name or a family member’s name in a public database, it is possible that someone who has access to her
23andMe genetic information may be able to connect her genetic
information to her or her family member’s name.149 This means that
it is possible for someone to connect a user’s genetic information to
her or her family, which poses great privacy risks, especially if the
genetic information exposes sensitive information about the user.
23andMe admits that it “cannot provide a 100% guarantee that your
data will be safe” but claims to have “strong policies and procedures
in place to minimize the possibility of a breach.”150
The consent document also provides that researchers may publish results which include the user’s genetic and self-reported information as part of a summary, lessening the chances of her personal
information being exposed.151 However, while identification from
summaries would be difficult, it is still possible “that a third party
that has obtained some of [her] genetic data could compare that partial data to the published results and infer some of [her] other personal information.”152 This means that it is possible, albeit unlikely,
for third parties to identify the individual user’s personal information even if it is published in a summary. The document further
provides that “[t]here may be additional risks to participation that
are currently unforeseeable.”153 In other words, users blindly sign
up for risks that neither they nor 23andMe even know about yet.154
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While the document thoroughly outlines the risks for users
associated with providing their DNA for research, it is buried so
deeply into the document that it is unlikely the average user would
read to that point or read it carefully enough to truly understand what
it means, like the other important provisions.155 This is exacerbated
by the fact that the document is online and not printed out, making
it less likely that someone will reach page seven—let alone read it
in its entirety.156
The document further states that even if the user did not consent
to research, her information may still be used “for other purposes”
described in the Privacy Statement but does not identify those other
purposes.157 The user’s information may be used in ways she did not
intend or to which she did not explicitly consent as a result of signing up for the website, and thus agreeing to the Terms of Service
and Privacy Statement.
Additionally, the document states that if the user does consent to
participate in research, she can choose not to take certain surveys.158
This gives a user the choice to participate passively in research by
just providing her genetic information or to participate more actively
where she can answer questions that might provide more insight to
researchers. However, the user may not understand that she has a
choice to take a more passive role. As a result, she may provide more
information than she has to, thinking it is necessary or without understanding the true purpose. Significantly, users are unable to opt
out of specific research initiatives; rather, they must agree broadly
or not agree at all.159
The document also provides that users who have consented to
participate in research may withdraw all or some of her genetic and
self-reported information from 23andMe research at any time.
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However, if the user does withdraw, the user’s genetic information
will only be removed from 23andMe’s research thirty days after it
receives receipt of the withdrawal. Moreover, the user’s information
will not be pulled from any research that has been “performed or
published” before this date.160 This clause, combined with the indemnity clause in the Terms of Service, denies legal recourse to a
user who wants her DNA pulled out of research. 161 Many of these
provisions raise a plethora of concerns for users who agree to it.
First, the way the document is presented to users—with the key
points before the rest of the contract—may discourage users from
reading the whole thing. The key points section, in fact , does not
list all the key points, as it fails to mention that users’ genetic information could be used for pharmaceutical research. This could trap
users into agreeing to terms they were discouraged from reading in
the first place. Second, the definition of research is broad enough to
cover topics which may not be widely accepted or considered ethical
by the scientific community now, such as cloning, but may be in the
future. This once again places users in positions where they may not
have known what they were signing up for, even if they did read the
whole contract, since these topics of research were not foreseeable
at the time of consent. Third, while the document outlines the numerous risks of taking part in research, these risks are not mentioned
in detail until the last few pages. The broad language and the deeply
buried provisions put users at great risk that their genetic information will be used in a way in which they did not intend.
C. 23andMe Research Concerns
23andMe’s almost unfettered access to and control over its users’ genetic information is concerning for a myriad of reasons that
implicate criminal, insurance, employment, information misuse, and
cloning and broader research concerns. In the criminal context,
23andMe says it will not give a user’s DNA to law enforcement
without a subpoena or court order.162 However, the company does
not say whether it can or will refuse to stop law enforcement from
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using the site as does GEDmatch, a DNA and genealogy website
that allows users to compare their DNA test results against other’s
results.163 Law enforcement used GEDmatch to catch the Golden
State Killer by creating an account and uploading the Golden State
Killer’s DNA to deduce his identity from potential relatives already
on the website.164 In fact, studies have shown that people generally
do not understand the risk that the use of their DNA by law enforcement poses to them.165
23andMe’s practices also raise insurance and employment
concerns. 23andMe says it does not give users’ information to employers.166 However, given that 23andMe has joined forces with
GlaxoSmithKline to create drugs, it is quite possible that it will team
up with an insurance company and sell users’ genetic information
leading to people being insured based on their genetic information.167 23andMe itself warns of the potential ways health insurance companies or employers can access users’ genetic information,
which are outside the scope of GINA.168
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As with any information on the internet, there are always hacking and blackmail concerns. 23andMe explains that there is a risk of
users’ genetic information being compromised in the event of a data
breach.169 Although the company claims to have put systems in
place to make a breach unlikely, the possibility remains that hackers
could access and use embarrassing or damaging information from a
user’s DNA to blackmail or publicly humiliate her or her family
members.170 Additionally, any de-identified information can be reidentified, making this an even more likely possibility.171
23andMe’s contracts also raise cloning concerns. It has become
clear that 23andMe uses people’s DNA for research and drug development without their full understanding.172 23andMe admits in its
Research Consent Document that there are risks and benefits that
are currently unforeseeable.173 Once the user has consented to
research, 23andMe may research:
[T]herapeutics development, conduct or support the
development of drugs, diagnostics or devices to
diagnose, predict or treat medical or other health
conditions, work with public, private and/or nonprofit entities on genetic research initiatives, or otherwise create, commercialize, and apply this new
knowledge to improve health care.174
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23andMe can also use its research “to understand the basic
causes of disease, develop drugs or other treatments and/or preventive measures, or predict a person’s risk of disease.”175
This allows 23andMe to utilize users’ DNA in a wide range of
initiatives that could one day include cloning, given the language
that includes treatment of medical conditions and improvement of
health care.176 While cloning may seem like a far-off dream, it is
“[n]o longer the wackadoodle scheme it once was.”177 Technology
is certainly evolving in such a way where it may be possible to clone
human beings, if ethically sanctioned.178 For instance, various types
of animals have already been cloned successfully.179 The first successful cloning occurred in 1997 with the cloning of the sheep
Dolly.180 In 2018, scientists in China successfully cloned monkeys
for the first time.181 Recently, people have even been cloning their
deceased dogs.182 Moreover, recent research has led to a 9% increase
in the cloning of animal embryos that lead to successful live
births.183 Not only will this increase the success rate of therapeutic
cloning, where scientists or doctors inject skin cells from other people into certain women’s removed eggs in order to clone small embryos and create stem cells,184 but it will also increase the success
rate of reproductive cloning, where a cloned version of an embryo
is placed in a woman’s uterus to result in a pregnancy.185
While there have been debates about whether cloning is ethical,
some argue that there are various justifications for human cloning
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including medical benefits,186 “such as growing new tissue and using genes to prevent or improve the treatment of diseases”187 as well
as other the possible developments of “life-saving and life-enhancing technologies.”188 Likewise, human cloning may provide a way
for couples facing infertility to have children.189 Scientists have also
argued that “there are several potentially useful plant and animal
technologies yet to be created which could also have vast human
advantages.”190 All of these justifications fall under the language in
23andMe’s research guidelines.191
Given that there are ever-growing justifications for human cloning, once the technology becomes available, 23andMe may very
well begin using its users’ DNA to do it. The language in the Research Consent Document certainly allows as much, as there are
many medicinal and health-related justifications for cloning. While
23andMe outlines some of these risks in its various contracts, it is
safe to assume that most users do not know about them because people generally do not read or understand online contracts.192
The biggest concern, however, is 23andMe’s employment of
its users’ genetic information in researching and creating drugs
without their full understanding, knowledge, or consent.193 When
users agree to have their genetic information used for research, they
agree that “[d]iscoveries made as a result of this research could be
used to understand the basic causes of disease, develop drugs or
other treatments and/or preventive measures, or predict a person’s
risk of disease” which may be sponsored by non-profit foundations,
academic institutions, or pharmaceutical companies. 194 The language in this provision is incredibly broad and opens the door for
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23andMe to take its research to possibly extreme lengths, such as
cloning, to create drugs, treatments, or preventative measures all
with the “consent” of 80% of its users.195 While 23andMe also provides that users can withdraw their consent from research, it states
that it will only prevent information from being used in new research
initiated after thirty days from receipt of the user’s request but that
any research on the user’s data “that has been performed or published prior to this date will not be reversed, undone, or withdrawn.”196 This means that anyone who discovers that their genetic information is being used in a way they did not intend will not
have their information withdrawn from any previous studies, it will
only not be used in future studies. This presents grave risks for users
whose genetic information may be used in objectionable ways, such
as cloning, that they did not understand they were signing up for and
from which they cannot fully withdraw.197
D. People Do Not Read Internet Contracts
While the benefits and risks of DNA research may be great,
23andMe users may not totally understand what they are signing
up for because people simply do not read online contracts.198 Since
users generally do not know what they’re signing up for, the
marked absence of laws that prospectively regulate the use of DNA
is problematic. Studies have shown that most people do not read
“exculpatory provisions, forum selection clauses, or other provisions in clickwrap/shrink-wrap or browser-wrap agreements.”199
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And even if they do read the provisions, “most people do not understand the language.”200 As a result, recourse is difficult because contract law is fairly confusing and inconsistent from state to state.201
A survey conducted by Deloitte of 2,000 US consumers found
that “91% of people consent to legal terms and services conditions
without reading them”202 and, even more stark, 97% of people ages
eighteen to thirty-four agree to terms and conditions before reading
them.203 Moreover, the language used in the terms and conditions
are usually “too complex and long-winded for most.”204
In another study conducted by professors Jonathan A. Obar and
Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, two researchers created a fake social media
site, NameDrop, to demonstrate that people do not really read contracts online.205 The researchers put absurd “gotcha” clauses in
NameDrop’s terms which stated that the company would share people’s data with the National Security Agency and employers as well
as take their first born children as payment for access to its social
networking service.206 About 98% of people missed these clauses.207
The researchers added the child clause, which approximately 93%
of participants missed, specifically to show that it is difficult to predict the future uses and concerns by big data.208
The researchers also collected data on how much time people
spent reading the terms, if they ever reached them.209 The majority
of people took a quick look and then scrolled to the bottom and
clicked “accept.”210 Of those who did not automatically select
the clickwrap and looked at the contracts to which they were agreeing, “96% spent less than 5 minutes on the [Privacy Policy] and
98% spent less than 5 minutes on the” Terms of Service.211 In fact,
200
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81% of those who read the Privacy Policy at all spent less than a
minute reading it and 96% spent less than five minutes reading it.212
Likewise, 86% of the people who read the Terms of Service spent
less than a minute reading it while 98% spent less than five minutes
reading it.213
According to the researchers, the NameDrop Privacy Policy
should have taken thirty minutes to read and the Terms of Service
should have taken more than fifteen minutes.214 However, they
found that some people who looked at the Privacy Policy and Terms
of Service only spent less than five seconds on each.215 On average,
though, participants spent seventy-four seconds reading the Privacy
Policy and fifty-one seconds reading the Terms of Service.216 While
the average reading times were still too short for what the Privacy
Policy and Terms of Service required, the median reading times
were a “more accurate representation of the general trend, at approximately 14 seconds for both.”217 As the researchers state, “[f]ourteen
seconds is hardly enough time to read, understand and provide informed consent to policies between 4,000 and 8,000 words in length.
Spending 14 seconds (or 60 seconds for that matter) is akin to not
reading the policies at all.”218
While the NameDrop study looked specifically at a fake social
media site, it shows, along with the other studies, that people simply
do not read online contracts. This begs the question: how can we
expect people to really understand what they are accepting when
they agree to participate in 23andMe’s research program? It has
already been documented that people who signed up for the program
did not understand what they were signing up for until they found
out 23andMe teamed up with a pharmaceutical company.219 Even
those who want to participate in research for the greater good feel
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differently once educated on privacy concerns.220 It is thus likely
that the vast majority of 23andMe users did not read or understand
the consent documents before they “consented” to 23andMe’s
research program.221
23andMe users have no legal recourse if their DNA is used in a
way they did not intend.222 There is very little statutory legal protection over genetic information in the United States.223 People do not
have property rights over their own body parts, particularly after
they have “relinquished” their body parts for research purposes,
even if they did not totally understand what kind of research would
be performed.224 Additionally, courts have continuously found that
clickwrap and scrollwrap agreements, like the contracts found on
23andMe’s website, are valid even if the users did not read the contracts before agreeing to them.225 This is in direct contrast to social
research which shows that the vast majority of people do not read
online contracts or, if they do, spend very little time reading them.226
This leaves 23andMe users who have allowed the company to use
their genetic information for research purposes that they did not understand or in a way they did not intend without an avenue to remove
their genetic information from research that is complete or already
underway.
E. Rights to Disposition of Gametic Material
While courts usually refuse to recognize people’s ownership in
their body parts once relinquished, courts have acknowledged that,
because of their potential to create human life, parties have a special
interest in their genetic material found in sperm and pre-embryos,
220
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fertilized eggs created during invitro fertilization (“IVF”) that have
not yet been gestated.227 When disputes about the use of such gametic material arise, courts have taken one, or a combination, of the
following three approaches: “(1) interpreting the parties’ contract or
agreement regarding disposition of the pre-embryos” generally by
looking to the parties’ intent; “(2) balancing the parties’ respective
interests in receiving the pre-embryos; or (3) requiring the parties’
mutual contemporaneous consent regarding disposition of the preembryos.”228
In two seminal cases, Kass v. Kass and McQueen v. Gadberry,
courts looked to the intent of the donors to determine the correct
disposition of their gametic material.229 In Kass, the donors, a couple
that had previously tried becoming pregnant through IVF, had gotten divorced.230 The wife wanted the pre-embryos created through
the IVF process implanted in her and the husband wanted them
donated for research purposes.231 The Kass court stressed the need
for written agreements when embarking on IVF procedures to avoid
litigation later on.232 However, the court also recognized that this
venture is difficult because “[a]ll agreements looking to the future
to some extent deal with the unknown.”233 These agreements are
exacerbated by the uncertainties that flow naturally from IVF technology and process itself, including “cryopreservation, which extends the viability of pre-zygotes indefinitely and allows time for
minds, and circumstances, to change” as well as divorce, aging,
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death, or the incapacity of one or both donors that may inevitably
change their outlook.234 The court most importantly recognized that
“[t]he central issue is whether the consents clearly express the parties’ intent regarding disposition of the pre-zygotes in the present
circumstances.”235
The court determined that the donors manifested an intent to donate the pre-embryos for research upon review of the contracts that
they signed at the beginning of the IVF process.236 The court looked
at the consent agreements, which were provided by the IVF program, that the couple signed and found that they had “signed consents indicating their dispositional intent…[and] neither party dispute[d] that they [were] an expression of their own intent regarding
disposition of their pre-zygotes” or that they were illegal.237 When
the couple signed these agreements and were provided with options
on what the IVF program should do in case the couple no longer
wished to proceed, they specifically initialed next to the option giving the pre-embryos to the program for research, clearly manifesting
their intent.238
The court emphasized that when determining if there is ambiguity in an agreement, courts should look at the whole contract, the
circumstances surrounding the contract, and the relationship between the parties.239 Importantly, courts should consider particular
words, “not as if isolated from the context, but in the light of the
obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested
thereby. Form should not prevail over substance and a sensible
meaning of words should be sought.”240 The court thus instructed
other courts to take the entire contract and its surrounding circumstances into account when deciding if there is ambiguity or not.241
The court also recognized that particular words can be important but
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should be considered within the context of the whole contract and
how the words may manifest the intention of the parties.242
In McQueen v. Gadberry, the wife wanted to keep the pre-embryos and the husband wanted to give them away for research purposes, to an infertile couple, or have them destroyed.243 The trial
court originally awarded the pre-embryos to the two jointly and the
wife appealed.244 The appellate court focused on the parties’ intent
upon entering the contract that governed the disposition of the preembryos.245 It identified some serious issues; the trial court found
that the wife may have adjusted the disposition of the pre-embryos
after her husband had initialed the page and that the two did not
have any discussions about the pre-embryos before the divorce began.246 Additionally, and most importantly, the appellate court
agreed with the trial court’s finding that the husband did not sign the
contract “with the intent that [his wife] be awarded the frozen preembryos in the event of a divorce.”247
Taking the evidence into account, including the husband’s lack
of intent, the appellate court concluded that “there was not sufficient
disclosure allowing Gadberry to make a meaningful decision
whether to waive any or all of his rights to the frozen pre-embryos.”248 Therefore, the appellate court found that “the trial court’s
findings of fact and credibility determinations regarding the circumstances surrounding the signing and initialing of the Directive indicate it was not entered into freely, fairly, knowingly, understandingly, and in good faith with full disclosure” but they affirmed the
trial court’s order that the two could not do anything with the preembryos unless they both consented.249
Even when there is no pre-existing agreement over gametic
material, courts have looked to outside factors to determine the intent of the person as to whom his genetic material should be
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
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awarded.250 In In re Zhu, a West Point cadet, Zhu, suffered a ski
accident.251 He was declared brain dead and taken off life support,
after which his organs were donated pursuant to his wishes.252 His
parents then sued Westchester County Medical Center, where their
son died, for retrieval of their son’s sperm.253 The court stated that
to determine where the sperm should go, “the talisman must be the
decedent’s intent.”254 While Zhu had not left any express instructions about what to do with his gametic material in the event of his
death, the court gleaned his “presumed intent” from some of Zhu’s
particular actions and statements made before his death.255 The court
decided that there was presumed intent based on several factors including Zhu’s organ donation card, his “devotion” to his family, and
his conversations with various people where he expressed that he
wanted children.256 The court held that, in light of these factors,
Zhu’s parents were the correct parties to make decisions about his
gametic material.257
It is clear that courts take the intent of the donors of gametic
material very seriously when determining its disposition due to its
special potential to create life. This holds true not only where there
have been disputes about whether signed agreements between parties accurately reflected their intent as to the gametic material’s disposition, but also when there have been no agreements or directives
at all. Courts clearly recognize that people have a special interest in
their gametic material because of its great potential and take great
care in determining its disposition and possession thereof.
F. Havasupai Indian Case
Institutions outside the legal sphere have also begun to recognize
people’s rights to their own genetic material.258 In 1990, members
250
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of the Havasupai Indian Tribe gave their genetic information in the
form of blood samples to Arizona State University for the specific
purpose of looking into the tribe’s predisposition to diabetes.259
Instead, the University took the tribe members’ blood samples and
researched their predispositions to mental illness and the geographic
origins of the tribe,260 betraying the tribe’s trust.261 While some of
the concern over the University’s research stemmed from tribe
tradition,262 the tribe made clear they had not consented to the kind
of research the University performed on their blood.263 This lack of
consent stemmed from the tribe members’ lack of understanding,
which was exacerbated by the fact that most of the tribe spoke
English as a second language and did not have a high school education.264 Therefore, the tribe members likely could not understand the
consent agreement as well as a native speaker could.265
In 2005, the tribe sued Arizona State University claiming a lack
of informed consent and “that they donated biological materials
solely for the purpose of diabetes research, so there was no consent
to conduct other research.”266 However, the court held that there was
“informed consent because the tribe members had agreed to give
their blood voluntarily, and had signed a form granting blanket consent for research ‘to study the causes of behavioral/medical disorders.’”267 Additionally, it held that the tribe’s consent was not “made
ineffective even if defendants did make fraudulent representations
to induce that consent.”268
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Although the case did not succeed in court, Arizona State University settled and paid $700,000 to forty-one Havasupai tribe members, returned their blood samples, and provided “other forms of assistance” in order to “remedy the wrong that was done.”269 Legal
experts found this settlement to be significant because “it implied
that the rights of research subjects can be violated when they are not
fully informed about how their DNA might be used.”270
It is clear here that the court, like many other courts, did not take
into account the tribe’s unique circumstances when deciding
whether the members actually gave informed consent or intended
for their DNA to be tested for purposes beyond diabetes research.271
The court simply decided that because the tribe members had signed
the documents, they must have consented.272 However, the University’s settlement reflects how popular understanding of genetic information privacy and intent is changing by recognizing that the
tribe did not intend for its DNA to be used beyond diabetes research
and independently remedying that wrong.273
There are certain similarities between the issues in the
Havasupai case and the current problems faced by 23andMe users.
While 23andMe users have wide educational and literacy ranges,
all of the users share one thing in common: they are people agreeing
to contracts on the internet. Although this is not the same as lack
of education or ability to completely understand a certain language,
studies have shown that most people do not read contracts online
and, if they do, they spend too little time reading them or simply
do not understand what they are agreeing to.274 Courts can look at
the Havasupai Tribe settlement as a rare example of rectification in
an all too common scenario—that is, when a sophisticated party uses
contract law to take advantage of an unsophisticated party. Here,
like some 23andMe users might reasonably assert, the sophisticated
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party used the genetic information in ways to which the unsophisticated party did not knowingly agree.275
III. EVALUATING SOLUTIONS: PROPERTY LAW AND GAMETIC MATERIAL

Users do not have any legal recourse if they decide they want
their genetic information pulled from research studies that have already begun or begin less than thirty days after they have withdrawn
consent.276 Thus, given the complete lack of avenues provided by
the current statutory scheme, case law, and the studies that show
most people do not read or understand internet contracts, it is probable that 23andMe will use users’ genetic information in ways the
users did not fully comprehend when they signed the Research Consent Document and there will be no way to prevent it.277
There are two viable avenues to legal recourse a user might pursue to have their DNA pulled out of ongoing research at 23andMe.
One option is for users to petition courts to recognize their genetic
information as property and thus allow conversion claims under
these limited circumstances. A more promising option—given the
current jurisprudence—would be for users to petition courts to treat
their genetic material like gametic material so they could have
greater influence over its disposition. Additionally, 23andMe users
could petition the courts to eschew current internet contracts jurisprudence based on studies which show that most people do not read
internet contracts.278 Litigants can also emphasize that 23andMe’s
Research Consent Document presents far greater risks to 23andMe
users than most other internet contracts that have been held valid by
courts
in the past.
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A. Treat Body Parts as Traditional Property
One possible form of legal recourse for 23andMe users is to
petition courts to reject Moore jurisprudence and treat genetic information as property that can be repossessed under property law.
This could be a feasible form of legal recourse, especially if litigants
can demonstrate to the courts that genetic information should be
treated as property—specifically because of the extremely sensitive
information that genetic material reveals about people from whom
it originates—instead of just focusing on the idea that ownership
rights should extend to those from whom the material originated.279
This option would give plaintiffs a stronger claim to the genetic material than 23andMe. Property rights may also give rise to “some due
process claims to genetic material taken or used without her consent
or knowledge of its removal,” mainly that people’s property cannot
be taken from them without due process of law, which would further
protect litigants from research misuse.280
However, there are also numerous drawbacks to this solution.
For one, having property rights over one’s body parts “does not ensure that one’s property will be protected under property rules.”281
For example, under certain circumstances, the “‘owner can be
forced to give up her property in return for compensation . . . set,
often by a court, legislature, or administrative agency.’”282 This, in
turn, might lead to people having their property taken from them
without any compensation at all because a court or agency may set
the compensation at zero.283 This problem has already sprung up in
the context of newborn screening procedures, where states mandate
blood samples to be taken from a newborn and screened without the
parents’ knowledge or consent.284 The eschewal of consent without
279
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compensation is considered to be justified by the public health benefit and demonstrates that existing institutions do not respect the relationship between property rights and genetic material.285 So while
property rights continue to apply to people’s commonplace possessions, like books, they do not apply to people’s genetic material.
Additionally, in order to sue under property law, there must be
an actual injury, so “the current judicial regime does little to protect
individuals from harm before, or when, their genetic data is actually
being used.”286 While there has been some success for litigants using
property law, usually it does not succeed.287 In the case of 23andMe,
if users’ genetic information has been used in research but no harm
has occurred (such as theft), users could not sue under property law
even if courts recognized their body parts as property.
The awarding of property rights over body parts may also create
problems for researchers. As courts have noted, allowing people to
have property rights over their body parts might stifle innovation
and scientific developments because it could restrict “access to the
necessary raw materials” needed for research that could be potentially helpful or lifesaving for others.288 Additionally, researchers—
and the companies that sponsor them—may be less inclined to “invest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a product
when uncertainty about clear title exists.”289 These, of course, would
lead to “an obvious harm to the public good” by limiting potential
research and advancements that could help others in dire medical
circumstances. 290
While property rights over one’s body may be a good form of
legal recourse for those who have already been harmed in some way
by the use of their bodily or genetic material, it will not help those
who may feel harmed but have not been legally harmed.
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Additionally, even if 23andMe users successfully petition the courts
to recognize property rights in their genetic material, courts may
take the newborn screening approach that compensation is not necessary for the taking of certain genetic material because of the public
health benefits that result from 23andMe’s research on its users’ genetic information. Finally, courts may be more inclined to find that
genetic material is not really different from other body parts, like
Moore, and be unwilling to take a position which may hinder scientific research. While this may be a course of action worth exploring,
it is unlikely courts would overturn years of jurisprudence and therefore is probably not the best solution.
B. Proposed Solution: Treat DNA like Gametic Material and
Eschew Current Online Contracts Jurisprudence
The best legal recourse for users who want their DNA taken out
of already commenced 23andMe research is to petition the courts to
treat genetic material like gametic material. Users should ask the
courts to take the gametic material approach of looking to the intent
of the donor in deciding its disposition. Moreover, courts should eschew traditional online contracts jurisprudence for a more nuanced
approach that takes into account the overwhelming evidence that
people do not read or necessarily understand internet contracts and
the significant risks 23andMe’s Research Consent Document poses
for users.
First, courts should treat DNA like gametic material because it
has the “potential for human life.” 291 Cloning is becoming less of a
whacky idea and more of a plausible route for scientific research.292
Even if DNA is not currently used to entirely clone a human being,
cloning and creating human embryos—however small—could be
considered creating “human life” depending on one’s ethical
views.293 With this consideration, courts should look to the intent of
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23andMe users who pursue legal recourse to determine their intent
in using the 23andMe website.294 While the Research Consent Document itself may and should be considered a factor, courts can also
look to what kind of kit the user bought, which may point to the
user’s intent. For example, the buying of just an ancestry kit may
point to use for entertainment or educational purposes and away
from the intent to help others by providing one’s genetic information
for research. The courts could also look outside the website to statements the user made to other people, her participation in other research studies or lack thereof, and whether she elected to be an organ
donor to determine her intent.295
When looking at the Research Consent Document itself, the
court—like the courts in Kass and McQueen—should look to the
intent of the users when executing the contracts and should look at
the entire contract, considering the relationship of the parties, “and
the circumstances under which it was executed.” Particular words
should be considered, not as if isolated from the context, but in the
light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as
manifested thereby.”296 Here, the Research Consent Document is
executed is in an online format, where the user simply scrolls down
and clicks “I agree” to consent. While this is technically an affirmative sign of agreement, the fact that this takes place online probably
means the users did not read all the terms before clicking “I
agree.”297 Moreover, simply clicking “I agree” at the end of the web
page is a lot different than initialing next to a specific option to
indicate how the user would like her genetic material used or disposed of. The latter would certainly indicate a stronger form of intent due to the time it would take to look through the options and
choose one.298
Courts should also eschew traditional scrollwrap jurisprudence
for the more refined understanding that most people do not read or
294
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understand online contracts.299 Courts have traditionally held that a
user does not need to read a contract in order to be bound by it, as
long as she is on notice of its terms.300 As a result, courts consider
scrollwrap agreements—where the user has to scroll all the way to
the bottom of the page before they click “I accept”—to put people
on notice and therefore bind them by their terms.301 However, these
rulings put almost everyone who has agreed to a scrollwrap agreement at a disadvantage because, as many studies have shown, people
do not read the contracts they are agreeing to and even if they attempt to read it, they either do not spend enough time to entirely
read it or simply do not understand what they are agreeing to.302
The court should also take into account that a user allowing her
genetic information to remain in the hands of a company that is using it for research has risks which are vastly different than the risk
of a user blindly agreeing to mandatory arbitration. While one contract may result in an unpleasant proceeding at a venue one did not
choose, the other may result in research that is eventually used for
cloning, which may go against the user’s moral beliefs and raise a
plethora of other concerns.303
Given the risks users are exposing themselves to by agreeing that
23andMe can use their DNA in research and the fact that most people probably did not read or understand the terms, courts should
not simply hold users to 23andMe’s Research Consent Document.
Instead, they should look to each individual user’s intent when she
signed up for 23andMe and agreed to research before determining
whether the user should be bound by its terms.
There are multiple benefits to this approach. First, 23andMe users will have legal recourse if their genetic information is used in a
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way they did not intend for it to be used and will be able enforce its
removal from 23andMe research that has already begun. Moreover,
people will be in better control of their genetic material and companies will no longer be able to take advantage of people through
scrollwrap agreements. It will also protect people from current unknown risks that may present themselves in the future, such as the
possibility of cloning.304
There are also multiple drawbacks to this approach. First, there
will be more judicial intervention and litigation over 23andMe contracts. Likewise, finding the intent of the users will be on a case-bycase basis, which would probably prevent a class action lawsuit and
result in many individual lawsuits. This path may not be the most
efficient, since only a select group of people have used 23andMe
and will revoke consent for their DNA to be used in research.
It is tailored enough, however, that it will not create a total upheaval
in contracts law.
CONCLUSION

We live in a society that tells us that, at the end of the day, scientific research and contracts law are more important than the ability
to enjoy decision-making authority over one’s own genetic information. That is, in a word, crazy. Courts need to get with the times
and acknowledge that many people in modern society share the most
intimate details about themselves online, including their genetic information. This greatly increases the stakes under current bodily autonomy and internet contracts jurisprudence, according to which individuals have virtually no say over what happens to their DNA once
they have signed an internet contract that they likely did not read or
understand. The time is now for courts to recognize that we live in
a different world than we did 100—or even just twenty—years ago;
there are new legal problems created by the advancement of technology that require new legal solutions. By following gametic material jurisprudence and eschewing traditional contracts jurisprudence, courts can recognize the brave new world that we now inhabit
and protect 23andMe users from having their genetic material used
in ways they did not intend.
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